Consider an exchange economy with a nite number of agents, who are arbitragers, in that they try to upset allocations imagining plausible bene cial trades. Their thought process is interactive, in that agents are conscious that the others are also going through the same steps. With this introspective process, each agent constructs a supermarket, i.e., a set of bundles that he considers achievable, in the sense that a sequence of plausible trades with other agents yields those bundles. We shed additional light on a result of Dagan 1996, by showing that Walrasian allocations can be characterized also as those where each agent chooses optimally from his supermarket. In addition, we extend the analysis to economies without short sales, where the characterization of Walrasian allocations is also obtained. Our analysis provides a di erent behavioral assumption for Walrasian allocations and connects with the core convergence theorem. JEL D00, D51. Keywords: Walrasian allocations, price-taking behavior, supermarkets, arbitrage-free equilibria, nite economies, short sales.
Introduction
When we teach the Walrasian model of competition to undergraduates in economics, we often stumble with the same old di culty: essentially, the model is not closed," since it does not explain the source of a fundamental endogenous variable, the equilibrium price. For the onemarket model of supply and demand, we often give an explanation that relies on agents that are not price-takers. If the market price were not the competitive one, but lower, some of the unsatis ed consumers would realize they could attract a seller by o ering an over and above the market price. Similarly for sellers if the market price were higher than the equilibrium one.
Three features characterize this interpretation. 1 The agents in the economy are not pricetakers, but arbitragers. 2 They are optimistic about their arbitrage possibilities. In particular, they ignore potential infeasibilities in their thought process: the unsatis ed consumers of the previous paragraph do not take into account that only a few more units will be sold at the market price plus . Thus, if they all hold the same belief, many of them are bound to be disappointed. And 3 the only allocation that survives the presence of these arbitragers in the market is the competitive one.
In the same spirit, our objective in this paper is to describe Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior in nite economies where many goods are exchanged. This will constitute an attempt to close" the Walrasian model through providing a di erent behavioral assumption behind competitive allocations.
In the last three decades, the game theoretic literature has succeeded in providing some insightful answers to the same question. These answers come both from the cooperative theory, with the well-known core and value equivalence principles e.g., Debreu and Scarf 1963 , Aumann 1964 and Aumann and Shapley 1974  and from the non-cooperative theory, with either auction-like centralized procedures as in Dubey 1982 and Dubey, Mas-Colell, and Shubik 1980 or with the more recent study of sequential decentralized trading models such as Gale 1986 or Dagan, Serrano, and Volij 1996 . In all of this work, prices do not appear explicitly and Walrasian allocations arise as the outcomes of either coalitional interaction or matching and bargaining processes in large economies.
The approach in this paper can beviewed as axiomatic, where the axiom is the arbitrager behavior imposed on agents. We follow Schmeidler and Vind 1972 , Vind 1977 , McLennan and Sonnenschein 1991 Theorem A, Makowski and Ostroy 1995 in their speci cations of equilibria based on abstract sets of net trades. Following Dagan 1996, we shall say that an arbitrage-free equilibrium is a list of bundles and sets of choice, one for each agent, such that: 1 the list of bundles is feasible for the economy as a whole, 2 the bundle assigned to each agent is top ranked in his preferences among the bundles in the agent's choice set, and 3 an agent's choice set must contain bundles that the agent can achieve after a certain process of recontracting. However, unlike in all these papers, our choice sets are not given exogenously to the agents. We investigate the implications of an introspective process followed by the agents, which is based on sequences of hypothetical trades. For a two-agent economy the process runs as follows. Imagine an Edgeworth box and suppose an allocation x has been proposed and is under discussion. Before agents give consent to it, x is put to an arbitrage-free" test. Originally, each agent i counts on his own endowment Z x i 0 as being feasible for him. However, once the allocation x is being discussed, agent i may make the following proposal to agent j: why don't you lend me your resources Z x j 0? I will pay you back for them with a bundle that you prefer weakly to x." All trade under these contracts give rise to the set of bundles Z x i 1 that agent i considers achievable, in the sense that they can be obtained through acceptable trade in the eyes of agent j. With the same arguments, agent j will think that the bundles in the set Z x j 1 are achievable for him. Of course, agents can look further and their thought process could continue.
Speci cally, given that agent i believes that the bundles in the set Z x i t are achievable for him and that so are those in the set Z x j t for j, agent i may think he can repeat the speech a b o ve: why don't you lend me your resources" Z x j t? You think you can achieve all those bundles, right? I will pay y ou back for them with a bundle that you prefer weakly to x." This constructs the set Z x i t + 1, and so on ad in nitum. This process of interactive introspection yields what we call supermarkets the limit as t ! 1 of Z x i t , over which agents will make their nal consumption decisions. 1 After they construct these achievable sets based on exploiting all arbitrage opportunities, will 1 Vind 1977 calls markets" to his sets, but we are in America. they agree to the allocation x? It turns out that agents' optimal choices over the supermarkets will be the bundles in the allocation x if and only if x is Walrasian. One message of our paper is that even if the world were populated by these arbitragers, the only allocations immune to their potentially upsetting thought process are the ones that Walras identi ed, but with no appeal to his auctioneer. Thus, if x is not Walrasian, at least one agent will believe that he can do better by exploiting the opportunities o ered by x; an outside observer would not nd x as the nal state of the economy.
Before making their consumption decisions, our agents explore the bundles that one could achieve through reasonable contracts with the rest of the economy, and reasonable contracts over those contracts, and so on. Their strategizing is boundedly rational in one respect, though. Just like price-takers, who believe that any bundle below the price hyperplane is feasible, our agents do not realize the frequent infeasibilities that their thought process involves, as contracts in the second and later iterations are built upon the ful llment of previous contracts in the thought process.
Based on the supermarkets, we provide a restatement and new proof of Dagan 1996 characterization of Walrasian allocations. The new proof is simple and, in addition, provides an alternative view of the result. In Dagan 1996, the auctioneer, instead of calling out prices, gives each agent a set of bundles from which to choose, which makes agents choice set-takers." In contrast, our iterative construction is a way to replace the workings of the auctioneer.
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All previous results in this literature, including Dagan's and our Theorem 2, allow for unlimited short sales. The assumption of unlimited short sales is very strong, particularly outside of nance. In general, we are used to think of budget sets as subsets of the consumption set. We incorporate this restriction on our supermarkets and extend the analysis to economies without short sales. It turns out that the characterization result cannot be found under the assumptions made for Theorem 2, which included continuity and monotonicity of preferences, as well as in-2 Our constructive de nition of the choice sets and that of Dagan 1996 resemble respectively the de nitions of common knowledge due to Monderer and Samet 1989 and Aumann 1976 . While the former looks at the iterative application of the operator everybody knows," the latter gives a more compact de nition, already in the limit, so to speak. Another comparison can be drawn with the two de nitions of rationalizability see Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, pp. 54-55. teriority of endowments. We prove Theorems 3 and 4, which in addition require convexity of preferences.
Supermarkets are the smallest choice sets that can be coupled with a Walrasian allocation in an arbitrage-free equilibrium. They are in general strictly contained in a Walrasian budget set, although both sets essentially coincide in di erentiable economies. When short sales are allowed, supermarkets inherit some other properties of budget sets: they can be written as the sum of each agent's initial endowments and a common across agents set of net trades, which is additive. In this sense, Walrasian allocations are anonymous, in that they o er the same set of net trades to each agent, with independence of his initial condition. We show that versions of these properties are retained in economies without short sales.
To understand the characterizations of Walrasian allocations by means of supermarkets, it is helpful to keep in mind their connections with the Debreu and Scarf 1963 core convergence theorem. Our agents' thought process resembles the trades that an agent could engage in had the economy been replicated. The two processes are distinct when one takes a nite numberof iterations, but they surprisingly converge to the same set of bundles in the limit Theorem 1. While in the core convergence theorem an agent seeks cooperation with an increasingly high number of agents, our agents envision increasingly complicated contracts among the same nite set of agents. The use of convexity in our characterization when short sales are precluded is another connecting point with core convergence.
Notice that a great deal of information is required by the agents in order to carry out the interactive thought process. They must know the endowments and preferences of the others. This contrasts with the informational parsimony o f W alrasian allocations, as usually understood. The same large informational requirements are needed, though, for coalitionally bene cial trades that yield core allocations in large economies. We put aside this important issue in this paper, and leave it as an open question whether a characterization with less informational requirements is possible.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to notation and preliminaries. The supermarkets and their relationship to replica economies are the subject of Section 3. When short sales are allowed, Section 4 reviews Dagan's characterization of Walrasian allocations by means of arbitrage-free equilibria and reinterprets it in terms of supermarkets. The relationship between supermarkets and budget sets is investigated in section 5. Section 6 studies economies without short sales and contains another characterization of Walrasian allocations that makes use of our construction. Section 7 concludes by discussing related literature.
Notation and Preliminaries
We denote by IR l the l-dimensional Euclidean space, by IR l + its non-negative orthant and by IR l ++ the interior of IR l + . Given two non-empty subsets A and B of IR l , we denote by A + B = x i n IR l j 9 a 2 A; b 2 B such that x = a + b . We denote by A , B the set A + ,B. We also postulate that A+; = A. Also, for a 2 IR l and B IR l , w e denote by a+B the set fag+B.
We denote by IN the set of positive i n tegers and by Z the set of integers. Given x and y 2 IR l , we write x y whenever x i y i , i = 1; : : : ; n and x y whenever x i y i , i = 1 ; : : : ; n .
An exchange economy is a system E = hN;X i ; i ; ! i i2N i, where N is a nite set that contains at least two agents; for each agent i 2 N, X i IR l is i's consumption set, i is his re exive preference relation over bundles in X i , and ! i 2 IR l is his initial endowment.
We refer to non-empty subsets S of N as coalitions. Let S bea coalition. An S-allocation in E is a list of bundles x i i2S such that x i 2 X i 8i 2 S and P i2S x i = P i2S ! i . We refer to N-allocations simply as allocations and we denote the set of allocations in E by AE.
For every i 2 N and x i 2 X i , de ne the preferred and the weakly preferred sets as follows:
where i is i's strict preference relation, de ned as usual.
An allocation x i i2N in E is said to beimproved upon by a coalition S if there exists i 2 S An allocation in E is said to be a core allocation if it cannot be improved upon by a n y coalition.
Given an economy E, we can de ne its replica economies as follows. For every m 2 IN, let m = f1; 2; :::; mg: Let E = hN;X i ; i ; ! i i2N i be an economy and let x = x i i2N be an allocation in E. The m-replica of E is the economy E m = hN m; X i;j ; i;j ; ! i;j i;j2N m i, where for all i; j 2 N m; X i;j = X i ; i;j = i ; and ! i;j = ! i . The m-replica of x is x m = x i;j i;j2N m , where x i;j = x i 8i; j 2 N m: An allocation x in E is a shrunk core allocation if x m is a core allocation of E m 8m 2 IN.
An allocation x in E is Walrasian if there exists p 2 IR l nf0g, p P k2N x k , ! k = 0, such that if x 0 k 2 P k x k , then px 0 k p ! k .
Supermarkets and Replica Economies
Consider for example a two-agent t wo-good exchange economy and suppose that the allocation x is under discussion. Denote agent 1's initial endowment f! 1 g by Z x 1 0 and agent 2's endowment f! 2 g by Z x 2 0. Suppose agent 1 proposes a trade in which agent 2 would give agent 1 his endowments in exchange for a bundle that leaves agent 2 no worse than at x. Denote by Z x 1 1 the set of bundles that agent 1 can achieve b y means of these trades. Similarly, construct Z x 2 1 from proposals that agent 2 could make to agent 1. These sets of choice generated by the rst round of arbitrage are the ones underlying core allocations, i.e., a core allocation x can be understood as one where each agent i maximizes over Z x i 1 see Dagan 1996 for more details.
The bundles in the set Z x 1 1 are considered achievable by agent 1 in the sense that they are delivered by contracts that agent 2 can reasonably accept. Similarly for agent 2 and the bundles in Z x 2 1. This is known by both agents. In taking arbitrage to its ultimate logical consequences, agents could envision more complicated contracts that would bestill acceptable by the trading partner and further expand each agent's set of achievable bundles. Namely, agent 1 thinks that the bundles in Z x 2 1 can be obtained by agent 2 somehow and that he can acquire them provided that he leaves agent 2 reasonably happy. This new contracts give rise to the bundles in the set Z x 1 2, which agent 1 considers achievable. Similarly, agent 2 calculates the set Z x 2 2, and so on. Thus, in order to see what is the set of bundles from which he can consume, an agent imagines an in nite process of mutually bene cial trades new rounds of contracts built on previous ones. The agents are too optimistic in assessing their arbitrage opportunities because the thought process involves infeasibilities: those contracts envisioned in iterations beyond the rst one are built upon the ful llment o f previous contracts. The nal sets of choice so generated are what we call supermarkets" They are formally de ned in the next paragraph.
De nition 1 Fix an allocation x in E and an agent i 2 N. Let Next we turn to de ne the set of feasible bundles for an agent when an allocation x is xed, the economy is replicated any n umberm of times and cooperation is sought with any subset of agents.
De nition 2 Fix an allocation x in E and an agent i 2 N. De ne the following sets:
The sets A x i m are useful to study the core of replica economies. That is, by the de nition of the core of an economy, the m-replica, x m , of an allocation x 2 AE is in the core of the m-replica E m , o f E, if for all i 2 N, The reader can check in Example 1 that, as long as the iterations are nite, the sets Z x i t and A x i m are not the same when t = m 2. In the replica exercise, when agent i cooperates with agent k, he buys" ! k , while in the introspective process, he buys" Z x k t, which in general contains more bundles. On the other hand, the replicas include coalitions that consist of only copies of agent i. These are ruled out in our thought process. These two reasons explain why in general there is no inclusion in either direction between Z x i t and A x i m when t = m. The di erence between the two processes disappears in the limit, as the next result shows.
Theorem 1 Let E be an economy and let x = x 1 ; : : : ; x n be an allocation in E. For all i 2 N,
Proof : The proof comprises the following two lemmas:
Lemma 1 Let E be an economy and let x = x 1 ; : : : ; x n be an allocation in E . For all i 2 N, 
Rearranging and taking into account that n k = 0 for k 2 NnF,
Since 0 2 P k2N Z k , W k x k and ! k 2 Z k for all k 2 N, w e get
which is what we w anted to prove.
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This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Note that the proof relies exclusively on set theoretic arguments. Virtually no assumptions on the economy are necessary to establish the result. Also, the theorem shows the equality b e t ween the two processes for any allocation. Next we present the de nition of an arbitrage-free equilibrium, rst found in Dagan 1996: De nition 3 Let E = hN;X i ; i ; ! i i2N i be an economy. An arbitrage-free equilibrium of E is a collection hx i i2N ; C i i2N i such that:
That is, an assignment of bundles and sets of choice to agents is an arbitrage-free equilibrium if the list of bundles is feasible for the economy, and the bundle assigned to each agent is top ranked according to his preference relation among the bundles in the given choice set. On the other hand, the choice set must contain the endowments and satisfy a recontracting condition, which s a ys that each agent's set of choice must contain all bundles that can be achieved through acceptable trade with the other agents.
Remark: Note that a Walrasian equilibrium is a particular case of an arbitrage-free equilibrium, where for each agent i, the set C i is the budget set H p i = fx i 2 IR l : px i p! i g; where p is the Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
For our purposes, we will work with arbitrage-free equilibria where the choice sets C i are the supermarkets. The following result demonstrates the relevance of the introspective construction.
Proposition 1 It is straightforward to see that Z = P k2N C k , W k x k is additive.
Proposition 2 says that, if hx i i2N ; C i i2N i is an arbitrage-free equilibrium, agent i's set of choice C i can bewritten as the sum of two sets: the initial endowments and a common across agents set of net trades. One example of such a set would be the half-space below the hyperplane through the initial endowments with a common price vector, but note that supermarkets will also satisfy this property. Arbitrage-free equilibria are therefore anonymous across agents in these environments, in the sense that, regardless of one's initial situation, the set of net trades that each agent considers available is independent of names. This is discussed in McLennan and Sonnenschein 1991 and it is stronger than the fairness" of net trades of Schmeidler and Vind 1972. 
Supermarkets and Budget Sets
In Proposition 1, it has been established that supermarkets Z x i are the smallest choice sets that can accompany an allocation in an arbitrage-free equilibrium. It follows from the additivity of the set Z of net trades in Proposition 2 and from condition iv in de nition 3 that budget sets H p i are the largest choice sets that can appear in an arbitrage-free equilibrium.
As an illustration of the di erence between Walrasian budget sets and the supermarkets, consider Example 1 once again. It can be checked that Z . Note also that this set is neither a cone nor a convex set, unlike the sets constructed in Makowski and Ostroy 1995. Arbitrage need not yield a convex cone, but its integer version," in nite economies.
Next we show that the di erence between supermarkets and budget sets becomes insubstantial when preferences are di erentiable.
Proposition 3 Suppose that E satis es A1-A4 and that preferences are di erentiable. Let x be a W alrasian allocation. Then, for all i 2 N, the closure of the supermarket Z x i coincides with the budget set H p i .
Proof : The inclusion Z x i H p i follows from Proposition 1, part i.
We n o w show that the interior of the budget set H p i is contained in Z x i . Let y i = x i , z bein the interior of H p i , i.e., pz 0. Partition the straight line segment z into a large number of small interv als. By di erentiability, there exists 0 small enough without loss of generality, taken to be the inverse of an integer such that for every k 6 = i, x k + z jNj,1 2 W k x k . This follows because the price hyperplane p supports the set W k x k for all k. Thus, x k + z jNj,1 ,x k 2 W k x k ,Z x k 1.
This implies that z 2
Therefore, x i , z 2 Z x
By induction, assume now that x i , tz 2 Z x i t + 1 the previous steps show this for t = 1.
Using that ,z 2 P k6 =i Z x k t+ 1 ,W k x k , we obtain that x i ,t+ 1 z 2 Z x i t+2, and so on.
This induction argument is completed in 1= steps to show that y i = x i , z 2 Z x i 1 + 1 Z x i .
6 Arbitrage-Free Equilibrium without Short Sales
The supermarkets Z x i use unlimited short sales since payments to agents for their resources are made by using the upper contour sets of the agents' preferences. Thus, it is clear that Dagan's result which can be reinterpreted as Theorem 2 is based on a property of arbitrage-freeness that requires unlimited short sales. The same criticism applies to previous results in this literature. Let us illustrate this point with an example.
Example 2 Consider a two agent, two good economy where agent 1's initial endowment is given by ! 1 = 30; 30 and agent 2's initial endowment i s ! 2 = 9 ; 9 see gure 2. Assume that P 1 30; 30 = fx 1 ; x 2 : x 1 ; x 2 30; 30g f x 1 ; x 2 : x 1 ; x 2 40; 10g fx 1 ; x 2 : x 1 ; x 2 10; 40g P 2 9; 9 = fx 1 ; x 2 : x 1 ; x 2 9; 9g:
It is easy to see that the allocation x = h30; 30; 9; 9i is not Walrasian. According to Theorem 2, there must be one agent, i, with P i x i Z x i 6 = ;. It is instructive t o v erify this. The reader can check that Z x 1 1 = fx 1 ; x 2 2 IR 2 : x 1 ; x 2 30; 30g and that Z x 2 1 = fx 1 ; x 2 2 IR 2 : x 1 ; x 2 9; 9 or x 1 ; x 2 29; ,1; or x 1 ; x 2 ,1; 29g: Then, 30; 30 2 Z x 1 1, 29; ,1 2 Z x 2 1,and 9; 9 2 W 2 9; 9. But then 50; 20 = 30; 30 + 29; ,1 , 9; 9 2 Z x 1 2. Since 50; 20 2 P 1 30; 30, we h a ve shown that P 1 30; 30 Z x 1 6 = ;.
Note that in order to upset the allocation x it was necesary to make use of the bundle 29; ,1 which has a negative component. In other words, in the interactive process it was necessary to resort to short sales. This suggests the question of whether a characterization of Walrasian allocations can be found in which the choice sets are subsets of IR l + and where the arbitrage involves no short sales. In general, the answer to this question will be negative. To show this, consider again the economy in the previous example.
Example 3 Consider the two-agent two-good pure exchange economy described in gure 2. Consider the following arbitrage-free condition where short sales are precluded:
C i + C j , W j x j IR 2 + C i i 6 = j; i; j = 1 ; 2: Let C i = fx 1 ; x 2 2 IR 2 + : x 1 ; x 2 ! i g for i = 1 ; 2. Clearly, the endowment point satis es this recontracting condition. In addition, it is a feasible allocation of the economy and both agents satisfy that P i ! i C i = ;. However, the endowments are not a Walrasian allocation, as shown in Example 2. This example shows that the characterization of Walrasian allocations by means of arbitragefree equilibria relies on the existence of short sales. We next show that, adding an extra assumption, one can do away with short sales. A5. For all i 2 N, for all x i 2 X i , the preferred set P i x i is convex convexity of preferences.
Consider the following de nition:
De nition 4 Let E be an economy. An arbitrage-free equilibrium without short sales is a pair hx i i2N ; C i i2N i such that:
That is, an arbitrage-free equilibrium without short sales constrains the choice sets to the nonnegative orthant o f I R l and imposes the same type of restrictions on the recontracting condition. Next we show that under the assumptions A1-A5, there exists a characterization of Walrasian allocations in terms of arbitrage-free equilibria without short sales.
Theorem 3 Let E be an economy satisfying assumptions A1-A5. Then, x i i2N is Walrasian if and only if it can be supported by an arbitrage-free equilibrium without short sales.
Proof : Let x = x i i2N beWalrasian. By Theorem 2 it can be supported by the arbitragefree equilibrium hx i i2N ; Z x i i2N i. It can be easily checked that hx i i2N ; Z x+ i i2N i is an arbitrage-free equilibrium without short sales where Z x+ i = Z x i IR l + .
Assume now that hx i i2N ; C i i2N i is an arbitrage-free equilibrium without short sales. We want to show that x = x i i2N is Walrasian. By Theorem 2 it is enough to show that x can be supported by the arbitrage-free equilibrium hx i i2N ; Z x i i2N i. Recall Theorem 1; it will be convenient to work with the sets A x i associated with replica economies. We therefore show that hx i i2N ; A x i i2N i is an arbitrage-free equilibrium.
Conditions i, ii and iii in de nition 3 are easily seen to bemet. Therefore, we need to check condition iv, i.e., P i x i A x i = ; 8i 2 N. Suppose not: there exists i 2 N and y i 2 P i x i A x i . Notice that y i 2 IR l + . Because y i 2 A x i , there exists a replica of size m of the original economy E such that y i 2 A i m. This implies that there exists a coalition S in this economy where for each k 2 N exactly n k m and n i m,1 copies of agent k are used by agent i, and such that:
By assumptions A3 and A4, we can nd y 0 i ! i ; y 0 i 2 C i IR l + , and p k;n 2 P k x k such that:
which can be rewritten as:
for any positive constants k , that is,
By A5, the convex combination of p k;n and x k is in P k x k . On the other hand, for k big enough, the convex combination of ! k and x k which is entirely contained in the non-negative orthant is arbitrarily close to x k . Since the preferred sets are open A2, we can bridge the gap between x k and its convex combination with ! k by c hoosing a suitable x k + k;n 2 P k x k in some neighborhood of p k;n . That is,
Since k can bechosen arbitrarily small by choosing k arbitrarily large, which makes k;n arbitrarily small and x k + k 2 P k x k , we know that x k + n k k 2 P k x k . Moreover, by the same argument, we can make i arbitrarily small so that, choosing j 6 = i we have that: x j + n j j + n i i 2 P j x j .
That is, we can write:
;jg x k ,x k +n k k + x j ,x j +n j j +n i i :
Therefore:
But this set is contained in:
where the last inclusion follows from the fact that hx i i2N ; C i i2N i is an arbitrage-free equilibrium without short sales. Thus, we h a ve found a contradiction since y i 2 C i P i x i .
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Thus, in economies without short sales, convexity of preferences is critical for the characterization. That is, while the result in Dagan 1996 and Theorem 2 do not need convexity, they rely on the existence of unlimited short sales. Recall that strict convexity implies equal treatment of core allocations and leads to core convergence. Thanks to convexity, if an agent can nd an arbitrage opportunity moving along a particular direction in the set of net trades, there exist in nitesimal net trades that are also arbitrage opportunities.
The next result shows the version of anonymity of Walrasian allocations that can befound in economies without short sales. At a W alrasian allocation, every agent faces the same common set of net trades in his supermarket, although the intersection of the common set of net trades and the consumption set will di er across agents see also Schmeidler and Vind 1972 on this point. The proposition also shows the essentiality of our construction based on supermarkets. is an arbitrage-free equilibrium without short sales. The other direction follows from Theorem 3.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have presented an introspective approach to the characterization of Walrasian allocations by means of abstract sets of choice. Walrasian allocations arise as the only ones that survive after all arbitrage opportunities have been eliminated. Our model, based on the introspective construction of supermarkets, dispenses with the services of the auctioneer, thereby departing from earlier work.
Makowski and Ostroy 1995 also present an approach to Walrasian allocations based on arbitrage. Unlike our model, theirs consists of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents. They show that arbitrage in their context leads to sets of net trades for each agent that are convex cones. These need not be at cones, though, when the economy is not di erentiable. Thus, without di erentiability, additional allocations that are not Walrasian can also be supported by their arbitrage-based equilibria. We h a ve shown that in nite economies arbitrage need not yield convex cones as the agents' sets of net trades. Supermarkets the smallest sets that can appear as sets of choice in an arbitrage-free equilibrium may be neither convex sets nor cones. However, all allocations supported by arbitrage-free equilibria are Walrasian.
Schmeidler and Vind 1972 impose a condition of strong fairness" on the sets of net trades available to agents. Each agent m ust prefer his net trade to any linear combination taking into account only integer multiples of the individual net trades in the economy. This is weaker than the property of anonymity, whereby each agent faces the same set of net trades. It turns out that strong fairness" only imposes that all net trades must lie on the same price hyperplane, and it is compatible with some non-Walrasian allocations. Vind 1977 requires that the set of net trades be anonymous and additive, and obtains the same results as Schmeidler and Vind 1972. McLennan and Sonnenschein 1991 impose in their Theorem A an extra condition that amounts to requiring that the set of net trades is the same half-space for every agent, so characterizing Walrasian allocations. Finally, Dagan 1996 deduces anonymity and additivity of the sets of net trades from the more primitive arbitrage-free condition. One of our contributions is to construct explicitly through the agents' introspection the smallest sets of net trades that satisfy the condition in Dagan 1996. All this literature utilizes sets of net trades that are not contained in the consumption set. Our paper, in addition, has extended the analysis by precluding short sales. There, we h a ve found that convexity of preferences is needed in order to characterize Walrasian allocations by means of supermarkets. Also, the anonymity o f the sets of net trades is reinterpreted: the intersection of the common set of net trades with the non-negative orthant will in general di er across agents.
